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Abstract: Security in wireless sensor networks is commonly based on symmetric encryption and
requires key-management systems to establish and exchange secret keys. A constraint that is common
to many key-management approaches is an upper bound to the total number of nodes in the network.
An example is represented by the schemes based on combinatorial design. These schemes use
specific rules for the generation of sets of keys that are distributed to the nodes before deploying
the network. The aim of these approaches is to improve the resilience of the network. However,
the quantity of data that must be stored by each node is proportional to the number of nodes of the
network, so the available memory affects the applicability of these schemes. This paper investigates
the opportunity of reducing the storage overhead by distributing the same set of keys to more than
one node. In addition, the presence of redundant sets of keys affects the resilience and the security of
the network. A careful analysis is conducted to evaluate benefits and drawbacks of redundant key
distribution approaches. The results show that the use of redundancy decreases the level of resilience,
but it scales well on very large networks.
Keywords: WSN; key management; combinatorial design
1. Introduction
A Wireless Sensor network (WSN) is a distributed computer network. The nodes that compose the
WSN are autonomous devices which can collect data from the surrounding environment, perform some
elaborations and communicate wirelessly with the other nodes of the network. The typical nodes are
low-cost devices with limited power and computational capabilities. WSNs are currently applied in
many fields, from military applications [1] to cold chain monitoring [2,3].
Symmetric cryptography is normally used to protect the communications. Since WSNs have
specific characteristics, such as low computational capabilities and a large quantity of autonomous
distributed nodes, they require specific key-management schemes to generate and distribute the
keys used to encrypt and/or authenticate the messages. Although there exist lightweight public key
schemes [4], they are only applied if the involved devices are considered compliant with the additional
overhead [5,6].
In literature, many key-management schemes based on different approaches have been proposed.
Any kind of approach involves benefits and drawbacks that are compliant with specific characteristics
(e.g., mobile nodes and deployment knowledge). Many approaches are based on predeployment key
distribution. Some of these schemes involve a memory overhead proportional to the number of nodes
in the network. Therefore, the size of available memory involves an upper bound to the maximum
number of nodes in the network. An opportunity to remove this threshold is represented by the
distribution of redundant sets of keys. i.e., the same set distributed to multiple nodes. For example,
the network could be divided in two parts. A complete distribution is done among one half of
the nodes, while each node of the other part has the copy of a set from one node of the first part.
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In this way the size of the network is the double, with the same memory overhead. In this paper,
the predeployment distribution approaches are investigated and they are extended with the concept
of security. The differences and similarities of the various approaches are analyzed to identify their
effects on resilience. The results show that the use of redundancy decreases the level of resilience,
but it scales well on very large networks.
The organization of the rest of the paper is the following: in Section 2 related works are described,
Section 3 describes redundancy effects in key management, in Section 4 redundant schemes are
analyzed, finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. Related Works
In this section, a brief description of the main state-of-the-art approaches is presented. For a more
in-depth description it is possible to read existing surveys on key distribution in WSNs [7,8].
2.1. Global Key
In the class of schemes, based on a global key, all nodes share a master key that is used to establish
the final pairwise keys.
Besides PGK, the main scheme based on a global master key is the Symmetric-key key establishment,
which is adopted by ZigBee (ZigBee Specification 1.0, June 2005, ZigBee Alliance). In this scheme,
a node A, with identification number IDA, starts the key establishment by sending a random number
(CA). To generate a common secret, a node B with identification number IDB, after receiving the
initial message, computes a new random number (CB) and executes a keyed hash function with the
global master key on the concatenation of the subsequent data: IDB, IDA, CB and CA. After generating
the common secret, node B executes a hash function on this secret to generate the pairwise key.
Then, node B sends back its identifier IDB, the random number CB and the Message authentication
code (MAC), calculated on the concatenation of the subsequent data: a constant number k1, IDB, IDA,
CB and CA. Then, node A calculates the pairwise key, checks the MAC and sends to node B a new
MAC generated from the same data concatenated to a second constant number k2.
2.2. Full Pairwise Keys
In the full pairwise keys scheme (FPWK) all the keys are distributed before deployment, and no
additional operation is required. Each possible link has a specific key, so each node stores a key per
each other node in the network.
2.3. Random Key Predistribution Approaches
Random key predistribution basically consists in the generation of a large quantity of secret
material and in the random distribution of a part of this material to each node. The first random key
predistribution approach has been proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor [9]. In this approach, a pool
containing p keys is generated before deployment. Then, a ring containing r keys, that are randomly
selected from the pool, is picked up by each node. During the network initialization, each node checks
if there are shared keys with other neighboring nodes. The values of p and r determine the probability
of establishing a link between two nodes and the quantity of secret keys that an adversary can obtain
by compromising a node.
A subsequent scheme based on random key predistribution is the q-composite random key
predistribution [10]. With this scheme two nodes must share at least q starting keys to establish a
link. They generate a pairwise key by performing a hash function on the concatenation of all shared
starting keys. The main drawback of q-composite random key predistribution with respect to the
scheme proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor is the larger quantity of memory required.
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2.4. Combinatorial Design
In combinatorial design [11], and in particular in block design, it is possible to generate sets of
elements that respect specific properties. These sets of elements can be used for various applications
such as cryptography.
In the key-management schemes based on block design, the elements correspond to the keys and
the sets correspond to the rings assigned to the nodes. Among block design a class often used for key
management is the Symmetric Balanced Incomplete Block Design (SBIBD). This strategy allows to generate
sets of keys with the following characteristics:
• a pool is composed of p = r2 − r + 1 keys,
• the number of rings of keys, which corresponds to the maximum number of nodes, corresponds to
n = p,
• each ring is composed by r keys,
• the same key is present in r rings, so it is shared by r nodes,
• the same set composed by more than one key cannot be present in more than one block.
Many papers adopt combinatorial design and in particular SBIBD for key management. A detailed
description is included in [12]. In [13,14], the application of SBIBD and Generalized Quadrangles to
key management is investigated and a hybrid proposal was presented. Srinivasa et al. [15] proposed
an approach based on SBIBD and multiple key-space. Lee and Stinson [16] used Transversal designs.
Ruj and Roy [17] used partially BIBDs, while Bechkit et al. [18] used unital design. In [19], Ruj et al. also
managed the triple key distribution that protects against malicious nodes forwarding fake messages.
3. Redundant Key Management
PGK, FPWK and combinatorial design schemes can be defined deterministic schemes with
predeployment key distribution. In this general approach, sets of keys are distributed to the nodes
according to specific rules. The presence of redundant sets, distributed to more than one node,
depends on the adopted strategy. However, all these options can be considered as specific
configurations of the deterministic predeployment key distribution.
In the deterministic predeployment key distribution, the set of r keys loaded by a node is
defined ring, while the set of all the p keys in the network is defined pool. There are two kinds of
redundancy: one related to the individual keys and another one to the rings. The redundancy of a
key (tk) corresponds to the quantity of nodes that know that key, while the redundancy of a ring (tr)
corresponds to the quantity of nodes that have that identical ring. The possible values of tk are between
2 and the number of nodes n. The values of tr are between 1 and n.
In PGK, there is only one key. This scheme corresponds to the deterministic predeployment key
distribution with r = 1, p = 1, tk = n and tr = n. This configuration has the minimum quantity of
keys and the maximum value of redundancy.
In FPWK there is a key per link. Therefore, the configuration is r = n− 1, p = n2−n2 , tk = 2 and
tr = 1. This configuration has the maximum quantity of keys and the minimum redundancy. However,
FPWK requires that each node stores a quantity of keys equal to the size of the network. Therefore,
the limit to the memory available for key storing also represents a limit for the number of nodes in
the network.
The intermediate solutions between the global key scheme and FPWK can be obtained by applying
ring redundancy to the latter scheme. If each ring, which is unique in FPWK, is loaded by two nodes,
the new configuration is r = n2 − 1, p = n
2−2n
8 , tk = 4 and tr = 2. More in general, in the deterministic
predeployment key distribution with ring redundancy tr, the parameters are:
r =
n
tr
− 1, (1)
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p =
n2 − ntr
2t2r
, (2)
and
tk = 2tr (3)
A relevant element of the previous configuration corresponds to (3). This formula implies
that each key is only included in two rings, and the whole redundancy depends on tr. Therefore,
this configuration is called the minimum key redundancy configuration.
The schemes based on combinatorial design have key redundancy and no ring redundancy.
Since n = r2 − r + 1, a scheme based on SBIBD corresponds to the deterministic predeployment key
distribution with r = tk = d
√
4n−3+1
2 e, p = n, and tr = 1. However, as with for FPWK, the total
number of nodes in the network affects the size of the ring. Therefore, the maximum size of the storage
available for the keys represents a limit to the size of the network.
The intermediate cases between combinatorial design and the global master key are characterized
by equations that depend on specific combinatorial design strategy. With the SBIBD strategy, in the
deterministic predeployment key distribution with ring redundancy tr, the parameters are:
r =

√
4n
tr − 3 + 1
2
 , (4)
p =
n
tr
, (5)
and
tk = trr (6)
4. Analysis and Evaluation
This section analyzes the properties of deterministic predeployment key distribution according to
its configurations.
We shall assume that an adversary can perform a replay attack and eavesdrop on all the links of
the network. An adversary can also capture a node and find all the secret information from its memory.
4.1. Resilience
One of the greatest risks in a WSN is that some nodes are compromised, and their secret material is
used to attack other nodes. The strength of a scheme against this attack is called resilience. In particular,
it is of special interest the resilience against eavesdropping, which is evaluated according to the quantity
of links that an adversary can eavesdrop after compromising a specific amount of nodes.
min(x,n/tr)
∑
k=dx/tre
(n/trk )
(
(ktrx )−∑k−1i=dx/tre(−1)k−i(
k
i)(
itr
x )
)(
(ktr − x)(n− ktr) + (ktr−x2 ) +
k( ntr −k)(
tr
2 )
( ntr −1)
)
(nx)(
n−x
2 )
(7)
max(x,n/tr)
∑
k=dx/tre
(
(n/trk )
(
(ktrx )−∑k−1i=dx/tre(−1)k−i(
k
i)(
itr
x )
)
(nx)
·
·
r2−2r+1
∑
i=max(1,r2−r−(r−1)k)
(
P(r, k, i)
(r
2−r+1
k )
·
(
(n2)
r2−r+1−i
r2−r+1 − x(n− 1) + (x2)
)
(n−x2 )
))
(8)
The quantity of links that can be eavesdropped by an adversary with one key, is always (tk2 ).
This value represents the quantity of links based on each key. The equations are more complicated
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if some nodes with their rings are compromised. The equations must consider how many keys
can be present in more than one compromised ring, and that the links of the compromised nodes
are no longer active and so they must not be considered. The formulas to compute the probability
that a link is compromised, i.e., the average percentage of compromised links, in the deterministic
predeployment key distribution scheme are (7) and (8), for the minimum key redundancy and for
SBIBD configuration, respectively. With the introduction of redundancy, it is possible that an adversary
compromises identical nodes. However, only different rings provide new secret material to the
adversary. Therefore, by considering x compromised nodes, both formulas start with a summation from
dx/tre to min(x, n/tr) which represents the minimum and the maximum quantity of compromised
rings (k), respectively. In fact, tr corresponds to the quantity of nodes with the same ring. The first part
inside the summation represents the probability that exactly k rings are compromised. It is computed
as (n/trk )
(
(ktrx )−∑k−1i=dx/tre(−1)k−i(
k
i)(
itr
x )
)
(nx)
−1. The denominator of this fraction ((nx)) represents the
number of possible groups of x compromised nodes. The first binomial represents the number of
possible groups of k different rings. The second element of the numerator computes the number of
possible groups of x nodes with k different rings among the ktr nodes that share those rings. This result
is computed as a difference. Since this formula does not guarantee that at least a node per ring is
present, the subtrahend is the summation of all the possible groups of x nodes that are included in
less than k rings. The summation is alternatively positive and negative since each superior group
redundantly includes all the smaller groups. The result of the described part of the formulas represents
the probabilistic weight that will be multiplied by the corresponding quantity of compromised links.
Therefore, always considering one compromised link, the results of (7) and (8) would be 1.
The subsequent part of the formulas depends on the considered scheme. With the minimum
key redundancy configuration, (ktr − x) represents the quantity of not-compromised nodes with
a ring identical to a compromised one. Each of these nodes has n − ktr possible links with a
node with a not-compromised ring. All these n − ktr links are compromised. Moreover, all the
(ktr−x2 ) links among the not-compromised nodes with a compromised ring are compromised. Finally,
k( ntr − k)(tr2)
(
n
tr − 1
)−1
computes the quantity of links among the nodes with the same ring that
randomly selected a compromised key. In details, the quantity of not-compromised rings ( ntr − k) is
multiplied by the number of links per ring (tr2), multiplied by the quantity of compromised keys per
ring k, divided by the quantity of keys per ring ntr − 1. The final result is divided by (n−x2 ) which is the
number of links among all the not-compromised nodes.
The first part of (8) is identical to the first part of (7). Also in this case the second part, on the
second line, computes the number of compromised links.
The index of the initial summation is i, which represents the quantity of keys not compromised
by the adversary. The part of the formula on the second line computes the probability that i has a
specific value. The minimum value corresponds to r2 − r− (r− 1)k, since the quantity of different
rings ntr = p = r
2 − r + 1 and since with k compromised rings, the maximum number of compromised
keys is the minimum between p = r2 − r + 1 and ((r − 1)k + 1), which represents the number of
keys compromised by a set rings that share the same key (i.e., among all the compromised keys only
one is repeated, and the number of different keys is maximum). The maximum value is (r2 − 2r + 1),
which corresponds to the number of not-compromised keys when one ring is compromised. The first
fraction within the summation computes the probability of the current value of i. The numerator is
P(r, k, i) which is a function that computes the quantity of groups of k compromised rings compliant
with i not-compromised keys. This value is divided by the total quantity of groups of k compromised
rings. The value of function P() is computed through tables. The tables for 3 ≤ r ≤ 6 are reported
in Appendix A. The last part of the formula is the fraction of compromised links. The denominator
(n−x2 ) computes the number of possible links between not-compromised nodes. The first part of
the numerator is the total quantity of links (n2) multiplied by the number of compromised keys
(r2 − r + 1− i) and divided by the total number of keys (r2 − r + 1). The result corresponds to the
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quantity of compromised links, but it also counts the links with compromised nodes. Therefore,
the (n− 1) links of the x compromised nodes, minus the (x2) links among the compromised nodes that
would be counted two times, are subtracted.
4.2. Experimental Analysis
To provide a clear idea of the properties of the deterministic predeployment key distribution,
the resilience of some configurations has been computed and plotted.
Figure 1 shows the level of resilience for a network composed by 84 nodes. The number 84 was
selected since it is perfectly compliant with all the tested configurations. Each curve represents a
configuration. The graph shows the [0,1] ratio of compromised links according to the number of
compromised nodes. As expected, for all the curves, as the number of compromised nodes increases,
the ratio of compromised links increases too. The continuous lines are referred to configurations with
r = 4, fine dots are referred to r = 3, while sparse dots r = 2. The ring redundancy is computed
according to r and n. Both for the minimum key redundancy and for SBIBD configuration, as r
increases the ratio of compromised links decreases. By comparing the minimum key redundancy
configuration to SBIBD configuration, it is observed that SBIBD always provides a better level of
resilience. Only when r = 2 the two curves are identical. However, this is a special case, such as for
r = 1, since both the approaches generate the same key distribution.
Figure 1. Resilience of the two approaches with specific numbers of keys per ring (written in the label),
with 84 nodes.
A representation similar to the previous one is presented in Figure 2. However, in this case,
the size of the network is not constant. For each value of r, the minimum value of n compliant with the
two approaches was selected. Therefore, it is not possible to directly compare the configurations with
different values of r. However, it is possible to observe that all the general properties showed by the
previous chart are confirmed.
The resilience provided by a configuration with a fixed value of r on networks with various sizes
is shown in Figure 3. Each curve is matched to a distribution strategy and to a specific number of
compromised nodes. The graph shows the [0,1] ratio of compromised links according to the number of
nodes in the network. It is observed that the size of the network only provides a slight decrease in the
resilience, while each curve is quite stable.
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Figure 2. Resilience with various networks, of the two approaches with specific numbers of keys per
ring (written in the label).
Figure 3. Resilience with various networks, of the two approaches with 6 keys per ring according to
specific numbers of compromised nodes (written in the label).
To provide a whole overview on the contribution of r and tr on the resilience, Figure 4 shows
the [0,1] ratio of compromised links according to the value of tr. When the values of tr are very low,
there is a visible variation in the level of resilience. However, the ratio of compromised links increases
always more slowly and for high value of tr the difference is negligible. This result is because of
the links of the compromised nodes. These links are considered not existing, since they are no more
used by the nodes of the network, but they cannot be eavesdropped, since the adversary directly use
them. When tr is high, the adversary gains an advantage by eavesdropping on all the links of the
nodes identical to the compromised ones. However, if tr is small, the relative weight of the links of the
compromised nodes is higher, and the other identical nodes are lower.
To evaluate the performance of a redundant scheme within the key-management scenario,
SBIBD with r = 6 is compared to EG with the same ring size. EG does not guarantee a full connectivity,
since some nodes could share no common keys, so its connectivity is imposed higher than 0.99. In order
to reach this connectivity level the value of p must be properly set. The formula that computes the
connectivity of EG is (9).
0.99 <
(p−rr )
(pr)
=
!(p−r)
!(p−2r)!r
!(p)
!(p−r)!r
=
2!(p− r)
!(p− 2r)!(p) = Π
r−1
i=0
p− r− i
p− i (9)
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According to r = 6 the configuration of EG that guarantees the best resilience is p = 18, while in
redundant SBIBD p = 31. By using the formula of resilience for EG presented in [20] it is possible
to compare these schemes. The comparison is shown in Figure 5. It is possible to observe that the
redundant scheme provides a better level of resilience.
Figure 4. Resilience with various networks, of SBIBD with 6 keys per ring with X compromised nodes.
Figure 5. Resilience with various networks, of SBIBD with 6 keys per ring with X compromised nodes.
4.3. Validation
A simulator has been developed to validate the proposed formulas. The simulator generates a
set of rings of keys compliant with the requirements. Then, it randomly selects a specific quantity of
nodes that are considered compromised. Finally, some links are checked to verify if the keys that they
use are compromised.
In particular, for every tested configuration 104 sets of rings have been selected and 104 links
per selected set have been checked. The results validated the correctness of the formulas. Figure 6
shows some examples of comparison between the results provided by the theoretical formulas and the
simulations. The relative difference is always lower than 3× 10−3, and it is attributed to the statistical
error. As a further proof, Figure 7 compares the curve obtained with r = 4, with the same configuration,
but in this case the double of the sets of rings are selected and the double of the links per set are
selected. It is possible to observe that the new curve is not steady, but the picks are strongly reduced.
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Figure 6. Relative difference between theoretical formulas and simulations.
Figure 7. Relative difference between theoretical formulas and simulations with r = 4.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, an investigation on the use of redundancy for key management in WSNs has been
presented. Thanks to redundancy, an upper bound to the maximum quantity of nodes due to memory
limit can be broken. The analysis provided analytical formulas to compute the effects of redundancy on
resilience. Moreover, the proposed formulas can be also applied without redundancy. The correctness
of the results has been validated through simulations. The analysis also showed that the minimum key
redundancy configuration provides a lower level of resilience with respect to the SBIBD configuration.
The initial increase of the level of redundancy produces a decrease in the resilience, but then the level
becomes stable. Therefore, the redundant schemes scale well on very large networks.
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B.M. worked on the writing and editing of the paper, while M.R. supervised the whole activity.
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Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
WSN Wireless sensor network
PGK Plain global key scheme
FPWK Full pairwise keys scheme
SBIBD Symmetric Balanced Incomplete Block Design
Appendix A. Tables
The tables in this appendix correspond to formula P(r, k, i). Each table reports the quantity of
groups of k compromised rings compliant with i not-compromised keys for a specific value of r.
Tables A1–A3, correspond to r = 3, r = 4 and r = 5, respectively. To improve the layout, the case with
r = 6 is split in two tables, Tables A4 and A5. A small part of the last two tables is repeated.
Table A1. r = 3.
k \ i 1 0
3 28 7
4 7 28
Table A2. r = 4.
k \ i 4 3 2 1 0
3 234 52 0 0 0
4 0 234 468 0 13
5 0 0 468 702 117
6 0 0 78 936 702
7 0 0 0 468 1248
8 0 0 0 117 1170
9 0 0 0 13 702
Table A3. r = 5.
k \ i 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
3 1120 210 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 2520 3360 0 105 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 1008 10,080 7560 1680 0 0 21
6 0 0 0 168 0 18,480 22,680 12,600 0 336
7 0 0 0 0 0 2520 31,920 55,440 23,520 2880
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 10,290 73,080 93,240 26,880
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1120 42,840 151,200 98,770
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13,860 140,448 198,408
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2520 86,688 263,508
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 210 37,800 255,920
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11,760 191,730
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2520 113,760
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 336 53,928
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 20,328
The rows of the tables corresponding to low values and high values of k are not reported. If k = 1,
independently from the compromised ring, then i = p− r = r2 − 2r + 1. If k = 2, independently from
Cryptography 2018, 2, 40 11 of 12
the pair of compromised nodes, then i = p− 2r + 1 = r2 − 3r + 2. If the value of k is higher than the
values reported in the tables, then i = 0.
As an example, we shall observe Table A1, corresponding to r = 3. If 3 rings are
compromised, then among the 35 possible combinations of 3 rings over 7, there are 28 combinations
of rings that involve one not-compromised key, and 7 combinations of rings that involve zero
not-compromised keys.
Table A4. r = 5, part I.
k \ i 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5
3 3875 620 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 15,500 15,500 0 465 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 18,600 93,000 46,500 11,625 0 0 186
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 3100 62,000 325,500 232,500 108,500 0
Table A5. r = 5, part II.
k \ i 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
6 325,500 232,500 108,500 0 4650 0 0 0 31
7 46,500 434,000 1,100,500 744,000 257,300 46,500 0 0 775
8 0 46,500 697,500 2,522,625 2,938,800 1,302,000 372,000 0 9300
9 0 0 0 93,000 1,441,500 5,894,650 7,579,500 4,185,000 879,625 86,800
10 0 0 3100 279,000 4,014,965 13,981,000 17,042,250 7,830,600 1,201,250
11 0 0 0 18,600 1,302,000 12,378,300 32,968,500 29,806,500 8,198,415
12 0 0 0 0 217000 6,466,600 37,874,250 65,193,000 31,369,675
13 0 0 0 0 15,500 2,173,100 29,434,500 95,759,000 78,870,975
14 0 0 0 0 0 474,300 16,600,500 103,555,500 144,552,225
15 0 0 0 0 0 62,620 7,021,500 87,100,700 206,355,375
16 0 0 0 0 0 3875 2,241,300 58,838,000 239,457,020
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 530,100 32,468,625 232,183,800
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 88,350 14,725,000 191,439,725
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 9300 5,471,500 135,639,725
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 465 1,646,100 83,025,750
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 392,150 43,960,015
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 71,300 20,088,775
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9300 7,879,425
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 775 2,628,800
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 736,250
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